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Abstract
The paper deals with the expected consequences of deregulation and liberalisation
in the European airspace, in particular  the effects on the polities of European airlines.
The paper gives an overview of the US deregulation policy and the effects on the
American aviation sector. Particular attention is given to the existente of contestable
markets.
Next, various freedom rights are discussed from the viewpoint of a joint European
airline policy. The likely impacts on European airlines are mapped out.  It is concluded that
the foreseeable consequences are probably not a replication of the US situation.
Finally, one of the European carriers which has a strong tendency towards global
liberalisation and competition, viz. KLM, is discussed in more detail. Various strategie
scenarios  are presented and analyzed.
1. Towards Free Skies
The aviation sector has traditionally been a protected and regulated industry. The
US has been the first country to liberalize the airline industry with the introduction of the
Airline Deregulation Act (ADA) in 1978. Since 1983, US based airlines were allowed to
determine autonomously the routes, destinations, frequenties  and airfares on their
domestic flights, while new firms who were fit, willing and able to properly perform air
transportation were free to enter the market (Button 1991). The resulting competition
stimulated efficiency and innovation in the airline sector and resulted in lower fares and
a doubling of demand. At the same time however,  congestion in the air and at airports
increased, while several airline companies did not survive the rise in competition (resulting
in new oligopolistic market structures).  The main  survivors appear to be, in general,  large
in size,  manage an extensive hub-and-spokes network, own a Computer Reservation
System (CRS),  are very tost-efficient  and have a good capability to manage capacities and
fares. The US policy was soon followed by Canada and Australia.
Airline deregulation in Europe has a much slower pace,  due to the heterogeneity
among European countries, the diversity of air traffic control systems and nationalistic
motives for protecting a national carrier. The first deregulation initiatives started on
January 1, 1988, while it is foreseen that in a series of steps (‘packages’) the European
airline deregulation policy will be concluded in 1997. The aim of European airline
deregulation is to create a unified market in an integrating European network economy
resulting in fair competition and sound economie growth, so that the European airline
sector moves toward financial viability, reasonable stability and sufficient  employment
(Button and Banister 1990; Button and Pitfield  1990). The regulatory framework for the
aviation sector in Europe will not entirely be dismantled, but will be oriented towards the
needs of the European market.
The changing competitive  conditions for European airlines have provoked various
strategies of European carriers, such as mergers, take-overs and alliances (inside or outside
Europe). Airlines have to find new niches in an international market without much
protection. In the present paper we will explore in particular possible survival strategies of
one player in the European airline market, KLM, against the background of the general
deregulation movement commenced in the US and the emerging European deregulation
packages. We will evaluate these survival strategies and try to identify a promising and
feasible course of action.  This paper is organized as follows. We will first give a concise
overview of the American airline deregulation movement (Section  2),  by a
description of current European liberalisation initiatives (Section  3). Section 4 wil1  be
devoted to a comparison of American and European airline polities.  In Section 5 we will
map out KLM’s  position in a liberalizing European airline sector, while Section 6 will be
devoted to an evaluation of alternative survival strategies. At the end we will offer some
reflective  remarks.
2. Deregulating America
Airline policy in the USA was since 1938 governed by the Federal Aviation Act
(FAA) and implemented by an independent agency, the Civil Aeronautics Authority (CAA)
(later on re-named as the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB)). The CAA was founded to ensure
stability in the aviation market; it regulated inter alia  airfares, access  (and exit),
frequenties,  cooperative agreements and competition on various routes (see for details
Bailey et al. 1986; Reynolds-Feighan 1992). The US airline market was subdivided ,into
(strictly regulated) trunklines (interstate, continental and intercontinental  routes), (less
regulated) local service connections (regional routes) and (restricted) charters. As a
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consequente,  the aviation sector was characterized by route and market specialisation of
privileged companies.
In the 1970’s the US airline market appeared to be an inefficient, oligopolistic
system with high airfares, limited service and limited competition, so that innovative and
advanced products  did not have a chance (Doganis 19941.
On the other hand, the more liberalized Californian airline market showed that lower
airfares and feasible airline operations were certainly possible. As observed by Williams
(1993):
“The overwhelming weight of evidente  complied  by researchers during
the 1960s convinced most observers that the CAB’s primary
preoccupa tion  with pro tec ting the airlines it had been given jurisdic tion  of
in 1938, could no longer be regarded as being in the public in terest.  Forty
years of tigh t regula tion  had resulted in an inefficien t,  s tultified scheduled
airline indus try. ”
As a result,  the regulation movement started which led to the ADA in 1978. Since
1983 the actual liberalisation started to take place  which had drastic  implications for the
trunklines operators. The expectation was that entry barriers for new firms were low, so
that new carriers would force incumbent firms to operate more efficiently. Even though
a significant share of the market was oligopolistic in nature, the advocates of airline
deregulation claimed  that the threat of newentrants would stimulate the existing firms to
diminish their monopoly profits (Shearman 1992; Williams 1993). Thus the assumption of
contestable markets  led to favourable expectations regarding the economie consequences
of deregulation. This idea takes for granted that existing firms would permanently be
threatened by potential entrants in case of excess profits (sec Baumol 1982; Baumol et
al. 1988). As a result,  fares would be at a competitive  leve1  and there would be significant
consumer  benefits. It is noteworthy that contestable markets assume absente  of entry
barriers; hence, there will not be room for excess  profits and inefficient airline operations
and organisations, so that prices will equal marginal costs.  It is interesting that perfect
competition is not necessary; market clearing can  be achieved already  when there is one
potential entrant  who can offer services at a lower price,  provided the transaction costs
of market entry and exit are negligible (the so-called hit-and-run entry).
The actual airline developments in the US have not always supported the
contestable market hypothesis. Many new carriers entered indeed  the aviation market, but
several did not survive and even various existing firms were forced to leave the market.
Clearly, airfares appeared to decline (in real  terms approximately 30 percent), the number
of routes increased and also  the frequency of service appeared to rise. On the other hand,
a significant part of the market was conquered by a few giants which - in contrast to the
contestable market theory - appeared to have acquired a significant market power as a
result of keen strategies (Dodgson  1994; Sinha 1986). The surviving six  trunkline carriers
are American Airlines, Delta, United Airlines, US Air, Northwest Airlines and Continental.
These megacarriers have some 70 percent of the US domestic market. This has resulted
in high entry and exit costs  for smal1  new firms, so that the basic assumptions of a
contestable market are often not fulfilled. The following causes for the market power of
existing large carriers can be mentioned.
(al The development of hub-and-spokes networks
One of the most protectionistic strategies of US carriers has been the development
of hub-and-spokes systems which allowed them to reach both economies of density
for flight operations in large airline networks and economies of scope by offering
to a variety of passengers yet a sufficient  flight frequency (Berechman and Sky
2
1996; Dennis  1994; Hansen  1990; O’Kelly  1986; Shaw 1993). Furthermore, they
were able to enter also the regional connections by starting feeder lines to the
major hubs. Larger carriers decided even to build up multi-hub systems. Clearly,
hub-and-spokes networks may cause inconvenient transfer and longer  travel times
for passengers, while they may  create  congestion at hubs. The organisation of such
networks requires also high sunk costs,  so that market entry for new firms is hardly
possible. Furthermore, several large carriers were able to acquire also the
governance of many  terminals in airports (management of slots and gates  via
grandfather rights), so that they could protect themselves against competition on
their own hubs (Barrett 1992). As a result,  there were many  obstacles for market
entry of potential competitors.
(bl The development of Computer Reservation Systems (CRS)
A CRS was traditionally meant to offer travel agencies rapid information and
efficient booking facilities, but after the deregulation it became a marketing tool and
hence a power instrument for airlines. Travel information shown on the screen of
a travel agency can be manipulated by the owner of a CRS, so that the owner-
carrier gets a privileged position in a booking system. Only megacarriers could
afford to develop and buy such a system, while other carriers have to pay  for
inclusion in a given CRS, so that a CRS turned into a powerful instrument.
Furthermore, through the information from a CRS it was possible for an airline
company to obtain a priority treatment of travel agencies through a bonus system,
while the CRS information base was also an effective marketing tool, especially
because of the access  to information on other airlines’ polities. One may  thus
conclude that the design of carrier-owned CRS has drastically influenced the
concentration degree in the US aviation sector.
(cl Diversity of fares
It is interesting that after the deregulation an enormous  diversity of fares on all
routes emerged, depending on a great many  travel conditions. According to
Wheatcroft and Lipman  (1990), even approximately 92 percent of all tickets sold
in the US in 1987 was a discount ticket. Especially in the init ial years of
deregulation, smaller firms managed to use advanced technologies  in order to offer
lower fares. The abundance of price  variations is difficult to be accessed  on a
regular basis in a hub-and-spokes network, so that lack of information may  preclude
competitive behaviour: there is not a single equilibrium price,  but there multiple
prices  which are determined by the organisation of the market. On top of it, there
may  be cases of cross-subsidisation or predatory pricing aiming  at eliminating
competitors.
(dl Frequent flyer programmes
The introduction of loyalty  programmes in the form of frequent flyer programs (FFP)
for frequent customers has created another way of binding passengers to a given
carrier, especially on business trips where the airfare is paid by the company. In
particular for a large carrier this system appeared to generate  quite  some extra and
stable demand,  favouring existing airlines and putting up obstacles to new firms.
In addition, the information contained  in the FFP data base offered an inexpensive
and accessible  marketing property for the carrier concerned.
(el Codesharing
Codesharing is not only a software issue, but in practice  it serves for newcomers
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as a way of buying access  to scarce slots at a given airport from a major carrier.
For existing companies  it serves to expand the network by booking and information
integration with feeder carriers. The result  of codesharing is usually  another barrier
for a free market entry.
After several years of deregulation in the USA, one may  point out  various strategies
through which the major airlines have tried to redress  contestability, such as:
0 waves of mergers and consolidations;
~1  higher  than expected degree of vertical integration;
0 dominante of a hub-and-spoke system;
0 importante of controlling slots and gates;
0 the higher  casualty rates  of new entrant airlines;
0 a rather complicated fare structure;
0 importante of a loyalty  programme;
0 important role of travel agents;
0 dominant role of computer reservation systems;
q a persistente and success  of predatory pricing.
In general,  one may  say that the American market is less contestable than it was
thought to be before the deregulation (Button and Swann 1992; Dempsey 1990; Gialloreto
1989; Molloy 1985; Shearman 1992; and Williams 1993).
We may  conclude that the deregulation has significantly altered the American
aviation market. The airline sector has become much  more efficient. Prices  have declined,
route choice has increased, and frequenties have increased as well.  As a consequente, the
demand  has drastically risen.  At the same time,  it might need to be recognized that the
monopoly power of large carriers has increased and that the profitability of airline
operations is stil1 marginal. The market is not fulfilling the criteria for contestability, but has
- with some exceptions - largely moved into an oligopoly of megacarriers which were able
to survive thanks to hub-and-spokes polities,  CRS and slot strategies, efficient
organisation, FFP’s, codesharing, and intransparant airfare systems. The question is now
what the likely consequences are for European carriers in case of a completely liberal
European airline market. This will be discussed  in Section  3.
3. Liberalising Europe
The American deregulation movement has set the tone for a liberalisation of the
European aviation sector. Although also the European airline business was fraught with
many  unnecessary restrictions, the nature  of these constraints was different from those
in the US: the European protectionist measures were much  more influenced by nationalistic
motives (sec  Pryke 1991). In the context of an integrating European market there was a
much  more pronounced need to remove nationalistic barriers associated with the
protection of national flag carriers (sec  also Button 1995; McGowan  and Seabright 1989;
Reynolds-Feighan 1995). This implied that the nature  of a restructuring in the airline sector
was rather different, as national interests had to be dovetailed, which means  e.g. a ban
on state  subsidies for national carriers Lsee Comité des Sages 1994). Consequently, a
straightforward transferability of US experiences to the European context is not .well
possible (sec  also Good et al. 1993). We will now first give a brief sketch of the aviation
policy in Europe in the past decade.
4
The Paris Convention in 1919 took for granted that states have sovereign rights in
the airspace above their territory. Consequently, direct government intervention in air
transport became inevitable, so that the free trade laissez faire approach during the first
years of aviation was gradually replaced by an incomplete pattern of bilateral agreements
between countries to or over which those airlines wished to fly. Countries can give airlines
from other countries various forms of freedom of air as set out  in the Chicago Convention
of 1944. These freedoms of air are (see Nijkamp and Hilhorst 1995):
EI 1 st freedom: The right to fly over the territory of a contracting state  without
landing;
0 2nd freedom: The right to land on the territory of a contracting state  for non-
commercial (technical) reasons;
0 3rd freedom: The right to transport passengers, cargo and mail from the state  of
registration of the aircraft to another contracting state;
3 4th freedom: The right to take on board passengers, cargo and mail in another
contracting state,  and to transport them to other countries of registration of the
aircraft;
q 5th freedom: The right to transport passengers, cargo and mail between two other
states as a continuation of, or a preliminary to, the operation of the 3rd and 4th
freedom rights;
0 6th freedom: The right to take passengers, cargo and mail in one state,  and to
transport them to a third state  after a stop-over in the aircraft’s state  of registration
and vice versa;
0 7th freedom: The right to transport passengers, cargo and mail between to other
tates on a service which does not touch  the aircraft’s state  of registration;
3 8th freedom: The right to transport passengers, cargo and mail within another state
between the airports of that state  (cabotage).
In the mid 1980s the European airspace had become an inefficiently operated and
congested transport area (Doganis 1994, Majumbar 19941,  dominated by flag carriers,
monopolistic rules,  bilateral market divisions and high airfares. In this context, Greece,
Spain and France  appeared to be proponents of strict  regulation, as this would lead to
market stabilisation, operational safety and service provision to peripheral regions. In
practice  however, this policy turned out  to be a purely nationalistic protection policy. It  is
clear that this situation was a major impediment to the European common market, so that
in the second  part of the 1980s - following the U.S. deregulation movement - various
initiatives were started in order to deregulate the airline market, to liberalize aviation policy
and to harmonize airline operations (e.g. through integrated airline control  centres  such  as
Eurocontrol) (see also Nijkamp et al. 1994). The established system of scheduled airlines
with their distribution of air traffic capacity, their double approval system and the strict
regulation of routes, flight frequency and fare systems became increasingly criticized, in
particular since it was not in the interest of the consumer.
Especially the increasing competition from the leisure aviation market (in particular,
charter flights) and the increasing penetration of non-European airlines on European
markets  (caused inter  alia by a non-coordinated European aviation policy)  led to a change
in the protected European aviation sector.
According to Doganis (1994) three driving forces may  be mentioned for the
emerging liberalisation process  in the European aviation market, viz. the American need to
relax strict regulations on the Transatlantic market by offering ‘open skies’  agreements (in
the same vein as domestic deregulation), the successful liberal  revision of the bilateral
agreements between the UK and the Netherlands (leading  to more competition and more
5
traffic at much  lower prices  on the Amsterdam-London sector), and - last but not least -
the EU initiatives to favour liberalisation in the airline sector.
After some first hesitant attempts at improving the European aviation market by
adopting the First (1979) and the Second  (1984) Civil Aviation Memorandum by
emphasizing the need for a Community liberalisation and harmonisation policy, a more
radical  decision was made to reorganize the European aviation sector in a series of
successive  packages (see Wheatcroft and Lipman  1990):
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
Wl
package 1 (1 January 1988)
a revision of capacity allocation (55-45 in stead of 50-50)
marginal automatie  approval of the 5th freedom right
more flexibility of fares (within some limits)
application of EC competition rules  to the aviation sector (except  for some
Mediterranean countries)
package 2 (1 November 1990)
compulsory award of concession to any new airline satisfying normal  aviation
criteria
right for any  airline company in the EC to fly to any other international airport in the
EC
further revisions of capacity allocation
further relaxation of 5th freedom right
further flexibility in setting fares (e.g. by further dismantling the double approval
systems)
more possibilities for multiple designations (more airlines from the same country on
the same route)
package 3 (1 January 1993)
entire freedom of tariffs for charters and cargo, and almost  entire freedom of tariffs
for scheduled flights
abolishment of capacity constraints or distributions
airline companies  need a technical permission (operational concession), but may  be
based in any  EU country; they have to be financially sound and their shares have
- in majority - to be owned by EU citizens
market access  is free, except  for cabotage,  although member states may  impose
public service duties on airlines for isolated or less developed regions
package 4 (April 1997)
introduction of the freedom of cabotage
entire liberalisation of the European aviation sector (except  for temporary specific
cases)
extension of European liberalisation to non-EU countries such as Norway or
Switzerland (and in the medium term to the 6 Central-European countries).
In a period of some ten years the European aviation market has thus become more
mature.  This long lasting approach has paved the road towards an official European policy
to gradually deregulate and liberalize the European airline sector in a stepwise way via the
above mentioned series of packages (see also Berechman and Reynolds-Feighan 1995).
At present, the third package is thus stil1 prevailing, which means  that there are no
capacity restrictions anymore and that there is 3rd,  4th,  5th,  6th and 7th freedom in the
EU. As indicated above, the 8th freedom (cabotage)  will be liberalized in April 197; only
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the Greek islands and the Azores are not part of this agreement. Until April 1997,
community airlines can fill a maximum of 50% of the capacity in a stopover in another
member state.
Airlines are in the mean  time  developing various kinds of new strategies to conquer
a larger market share, e.g. through mergers, take-overs, participating strategies, strategie
alliances etc. This means  that aviation policy in the EU has to find a balance between
competitive price wars (e.g., price dumping, predatory pricing)  and a market structure
without a high monopoly degree. It is in the interest of all parties to have free access with
a sufficient number of competitors, a financially viable aviation sector with a reasonable
degree of stability, and a capacity that is in agreement with the tariff structure. Some
regulations will be needed to ensure a technically feasible and socially acceptable  aviation
market (e.g., standardisation, connectivity to lagging  peripheral areas).  European
liberalisation seems to imply not necessarily deregulation, but re-regulation of national
competences. This is a differente with respect to the US, as will be indicated in the next
section.
4. Comparing Europe and the US
The gradual transformation of the European air transport market is clearly not an
easy policy and far more complicated that the US air market. In fact,  the main  aim of the
EU aviation policy is not deregulation, but fair competition and economie  growth for all
member states. Consequently, the European situation differs from that in the US. Below,
the major differences between the European and American aviation sector are outlined (see
also Torn 1995).
European Union
0 the EU comprises 15 countries, with a diversity of languages, national carriers, and
indigenous economie,  technological and politica1 interests; most flag carriers are
also (largely)  state-owned
0 most flights are international
n the European market is smal1  and the population density is relatively high, so that
the average distances are relatively short (approx. 750 kilometres) with less
possibilities for hub-and-spokes networks.
0 given the average relatively smal1  air distances, there is much  competition from rail
and road
0 the charter market is a large market; it is highly competitive and has low fares
0 the power of airlines is limited, as they do not own terminals of airports
0 CRS are usually owned by multiple companies  (without free access to company-
specific  information)
0 the tost  leve1 is normally very high in Europe (as a result  of wages, landing fees,
kerosine prices,  short distances, and operational restrictions in the European
airspace).
United States
0 the US is a single, mono-lingua1 nation  without one clearly identified flag carrier i
0 the direct government involvement in the aviation sector is much  less: there are no
state  or federal companies  and no direct state  or federal subsidies (except  some
temporary financial relaxation based on the so-called Chapter 1 1).
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Li the majority of fl ights is domestic and hence less hampered by protectionist
measures
0 the air traffic control  system in the US is more harmonized and hence more efficient
than the fragmented European system
0 the population centres  are much  further apart, so that the average  flight distance
in the US is about 1300 kilometres (which allows for the creation of hub-and-
spokes networks).
0 because of long distances and by poorly  developed railway systems, there is no
clear multi-modal competition for the airlines (except  the car for medium-range
distances)
0 the charter market in the US is not a wel1 developed segment of the aviation sector
ü terminals and CRS are often owned by airlines, which gives them a high controlling
power for slots and gates  at airports
0 the general  tost  leve1 is rather  low (often  accompanied by a low service leve1 on
board).
As a consequente of these differences it has been for the US less difficult to
undertake a regulatory reform. The specific  national features of the European aviation
industry has made it more difficult to respond efficiently to the new challenges.
Furthermore, the European market is smaller than the US market, so that it may  be difficult
to benefit sufficiently from economies  of scope and of density under the current regimes
(Williams  1993). Nevertheless, there wili be a permanent pressure for more efficiency in
the airline sector in Europe, so that the system of flag carriers will be put under severe
pressure in the future.
After this general  overview of differences between the European and the US
aviation sector, the question may  be raised in how far lessons learned from the US
experiences can be transferred to Europe. We will follow here Button (1996) who made
the observation that the US experiences have limited relevante for the EU policy due to
the following reasons:
the domestic/international traffic split (about 53% of departures by EU registered
airlines were international compared to about 15% for US registered carriers).
the non-scheduled market (some 25% of passengers carried  within the 22 member
countries of the European Civil Aviation Conference were by charter compared to
some 1% of the domestic US partners)
market size  (only  some 20% of the 75 main routes in Europe have a flying time  of
more than two hours)
production efficiency (the average  labour productivity of European airlines is far
below the US average; for example, BA and KLM, the most efficient ones  in the
European market, are stil1 only about 70% as efficient as their US counterparts)
ownership of airlines (the public sector participation in European airlines is
somewhat declining but stil1 excessively high compared to the US, where the
aviation industry is in private hands)
inter-modal  competition (in recent years, rapid railway systems have meant a
severe competition for airlines, but they have also favoured airports that were
connected with high speed train services)
infrastructure  availability (the increase in travel demand  has placed  more stress on
the capacity of airports and flights corridors, in particular as the air traffic control
forms a less uniform patchwork system which is also strongly influenced by military
aviation; each  country has its own dedicated military airspace)
the wider international context (the EU aviation policy is part of a broader Eurobean
integration policy, while at the same time  there is a strong world-wide tendency to
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remove trade barriers in and between continents  all  over)
c advantage of hindsight (various negative results of the US experience - such as
monopoly power exercised by codesharing, CRS and gate ownerships by carriers -
can  be coped with in Europe seeking for remedial policy measures, (e.g. alliances
rather than takeovers).
It seems thus that European liberalisation will not cause  a sudden revolution in the
aviation sector, but will rather be characterized by a controlled chain reaction. The various
packages are - in light of the great many national interests - fairly balanced, provided they
wil1  be strictly applied without any  exception. This means that national interests will have
to be suppressed to the maximum extent possible. Under such conditions a contestable
market may emerge which will force incumbent firms to operate more efficiently. The
recent successful strategy of EBA (Euro Belgian Airlines) - offering extremely low fares
with a low service leve1  (comparable to South West Airlines in the US) - is an illustration
that competitive  newcomers may exert a significant market power.
For the time being however,  airfares have not shown a drastic  decline (except  on
the Amsterdam - London sector); one needs as a rule of thumb at least three carriers on
the same route to induce  price  competition (but this is not feasible on most European
sectors). Only the charter market has demonstrated its ability to reduce prices drastically.
Another concern in the European aviation development is the existente  of
grandfather rights on existing airports, so that newcomers can  hardly obtain landing rights
(the recent discussion on the open access  to the Paris airport  Orly is a good illustration of
the fact  that even the third EU aviation package is not always respected, when it concerns
scarce slots).
In addition, many airports appear to have a monopoly position for groundhandling
(checking  in, baggage handling), which is often even controlled by the domestic airline.
This means high costs  and low efficiency (in the EU the costs  of groundhandling amount
to more than 12% of total costs  of airlines). Apart from the low service leve1  offered by
a competitor, there is also  the problem that this competitor has access  to commercially
sensitive information of another airline.
In conclusion, there is a wide range of concerns in the European aviation industry
which need to be addressed by EU policy-makers. The most prominent ones are:
e competition policy (price  dumping, predatory pricing, unfair marketing, manipulation
of slots, flight scheduling, cabotage, codesharing, frequent flyer programmes, state
subsidies etc.)
0 environment (efficient  air traffic control,  strict  safety regulations, efficient
groundhandling, modern equipment etc.)
0 external policy (uniform exterior policy, world-wide standardised air traffic control,
grandfather rights and open skies agreements etc.)
0 congestion in the air (slot allocation, Eurocontrol, satellite communication)
0 harmonisation of regulation (safety, licenses, training of personnel, environment).
The question whether the future European airline system will replicate the American
hub-and-spokes model depends on the implementation of the various policy packages and
on the way the various above mentioned concerns will be addressed by national and
supranational governments in Europe. However,  it seems - in the light of the substantial
differences between the European and the American aviation market - very unlikely that
the future of the European aviation system will be a repetition of the American experience.
Clearly, there may be a tendency to a hub-and-spokes system supported by a feeder
system, but national interests will most likely prevent the emergence of a few single hubs
in Europe. In light of the current tendenties,  it seems more likely that a limited number of
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globally-oriented hubs wil1 emerge (e.g., Frankfurt, London, Paris, Amsterdam, Rome)
accompanied by a set of so-called Eurohubs serving preponderantly the European market.
Thus, some sort of hierarchical aviation system replicating the economie  and
politica1 strength of European cities, regions and countries seems to be a plausible result.
Clearly, there is much  more scope for alliances, mergers and take-overs in the European
airline industry, but this does not necessarily mean  the development to a single hub-and-
spokes network. It is more likely that a patchwork airline system will evolve in which all
national players are to some extent represented, even though the notion of a national flag
carrier may  become an outdated one in the next century. But the economie  forces have
to cape with socio-politica1 forces,  and the result  may  be a mixed - and partly hierarchical -
aviation system in Europe.
5. From Flying Dutchman  to Global  Carrier
In this - and the next section  - we will - by way of illustration - pay  some more
attention to one player in the aviation market, viz. KLM. This Dutch-based airline has
developed as a pronounced advocate of the free skies  principle,  and therefore it may  be
interesting to discuss  its policy in greater detail. The company has to face the following
developments in the aviation industry:
íl liberalisation in Europe
0 increase of air traffic with declining airfares, more geographical mobility and further
globalisation
c world-wide competition and deregulation
0 increasing privatisation of airlines (e.g., BA, Lufthansa)
3 global alliances between various airlines leading to more economies  of scale and
scope.
In order to cape  with the great many  recent challenges in the aviation sector, KLM
has developed a rigorous  liberalisation policy, inside and outside Europe. Together with BA,
this carrier is a straightforward supporter of freedom in the air (including all routes, prices
and frequenties), provided such a liberal  policy will apply to all other European airlines.
Even the idea of a national flag carrier is in the opinion of KLM outdated; many  flights
inside and outside Europe are nowadays jointly operated with other companies  (in
particular, Northwest Airlines), while also a complex net of feeder lines has been built up.
The overall objective of the company is to ensure a sustainable competitive position in a
global airline system, together with its many  partners (NWA, Air UK, Transavia etc.). To
achieve  this, it will be necessary to reduce  costs,  to enlarge its market share and to
guarantee a sufficient profitability. Labour productivity had to increase (more than 50%),
as wel1 as capita1 productivity (more than 10%) (by introducing a ‘three black  system’ for
departing and arriving airplanes on most European flights). As a result,  the growth in
European flights amounted to some 55%, with the consequente that European and
intercontinental flights could be more harmonized and be offered at competitive prices  due
to a quality increase in transfers. On top of it, KLM also executed a major restructuring of
the company (e.g. outsourcing of non-core business). The company has adopted its most
direct and most efficiently operating competitors as a benchmark. Instead of a traditional
‘tost-plus’ policy the company is now forced to use a ‘price  driven casting’.  Through its
Galileo CRS, KLM has adequate insight into the tariff polities of its main  competitors, so
that it can  quickly respond to new developments.
Strategie  alliances with other airlines are for KLM a sine qua non in a highly
competitive market, as such alliances will assist  in fulfilling the following goals:
10
c to build up a global network (KLM as global carrier)
0 to increase both its European and wond-wide market share
0 to improve its position as a transfer airline
G to raise efficiency and to reduce  costs in the whole  production chain
0 to benefit from density advantages (e.g., hubs policy, negotiation position etc.).
It is noteworthy that many  alliance attempts have failed in the recent past (e.g.,
Sabena, Air Littoral, BA, Alcazar), but various other cooperative agreements and
partncrships have become successful, both outside Europe (e.g., NWA, Garuda, ALM) and
inside Europe (e.g. Air UK, Transavia, Air Exel, Delta Air Transport, Maersk Air, Austrian
Airlines, Tyrolean Airways, Cyprus Airways, Eurowings and Martinair). Thus, the model
has been here to look for global partners, regional partners and feeder partners. A major
question is of course, how long one has to wait to seek for a more intensive alliance with
a larger European partner. Recent alliances (e.g., between Lufthansa and SAS, or between
Swissair and Sabena) illustrate that the aviation market in Europe is stil1 in full motion.
Therefore, it may  be interesting to compare  KLM with some US carriers (viz.  Delta Airlines
(DL), American Airlines (AA) and United Airlines (UA),  in order to draw some strategie
lessons for the company’s long-term policy (see for more details Torn 1995).
employees
number of airplanes
annual passengers
passengers kilometres
revenues
yield
productivity (mln tonkm
per employee)
occupancy rate
critical occupancy rate
24,177 71,412 110,000
91 550 647
ll.8 mln 87.4mln 95mln
41,767mln 137,096mln ~ 159,124mln
7,897mln 21,995mln 25,977mln
107 cents 7.75 cents 8.0 cents
0.34 3.38 2.27
74.4%
69.9%
indicators KLM DL AA UA
1
64.6%
67.2%
64.8%
61.5%
78,000
550
74mln
174,253mln
23,624mln
8.1 cents
3.60
71.2%
68.2%
Table 1. Comparison of performance indicators of KLM, DL, AA and UA
The picture from Table 1 is rather  illuminating. It shows clearly that KLM - as a
representative of all other European carriers - has a relatively high tost  level. This is caused
by various factors which are specific  for Europe:
0 high landing fees and air traffic control  fees
0 high kerosine costs
0 a dominante of a short (and thus relatively costly) routes
0 many  operational restrictions on flight routes leading to some 20 percent detours
0 many  additional restrictions and expensive policy measures (e.g., veterinary checks,
immigration checks etc.)
0 a relatively high congestion leve1
0 less favourable leasing conditions for airplanes
0 high salary costs (salaries in the airline sector in the US have decreased in both real
and nomina1 terms).
lt is clear that many  of these costs are beyond the control  of individual carriers in
Europe, so that also a liberalisation will not lead to an automatie  improvement of the
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qperformance of European airlines. This means  that European aviation policy should also
address  many  more issues than just competit ion policy in the aviation industry. An
important question is now how  airlines (and in particular KLMI  have to respond to these
challenges.
6. The Sky is the Limit
The strategie  positioning of a relatively smal1 airline in a turbulent global aviation
industry is not an easy matter. First, air traffic is largely a derivative of macro-economie
and politica1 factors,  such as world-wide economie  development, industrial globalisation,
the emerging leisure society, international peace, intermodal competition etc. Second,  the
development of the aviation industry is heavily influenced by liberalisation, deregulation
and privatisation movements which concern a great deal of actors. Shearman (1992)
distinguishes 6 major parties in the aviation sector who all impact on the performance of
the sector:
c! the airlines (carriers)
c the airports (including fixed facilities and groundhandling)
0 air traffic control  systems
c the aircraft industry
0 regulatory bodies (e.g., national governments, EU)
0 travel agents and their operators
Consequently, the exploration of the future development of the airline sector is a complex
undertaking which requires the use of various scenarios  in order to depict  uncertainties and
to identify new opportunities.
In the context of our analysis of KLM’s  future strategies, we distinguish here 5
distinct scenario’s (covering  a period of some 20 years)  which are outside the control  of
the company but which will influence decisively its future position:
ci Back to Protection (BTP)
El Status Quo (STQ)
0 Business as Usual (BAU)
0 European Liberalisation (EUL)
0 Global Liberalisation (GLL)
We wil1 now concisely describe these 5 scenario’s.
Back to Protection (BTP)
This scenario assumes a change in EU policy towards more traditional protection
of flag carriers, based on a strict  government intervention (including  state  owned carriers),
inter  alia via the use of bilateral agreements on tariffs, capacity, frequenties and market
access.  In that case, KLM would re-assume its role as a national flag carrier, which would
lead to a relatively smal1  market position in Europe. Despite some support of Mediterranean
countries for this scenario, the viability of this option is rather  low.
Status Quo (STQ)
In this scenario the present European aviation situation would be frozen. This means
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that state  subsidies wil1 remain, while individual countries will be responsible for bilateral
open skies  agreements with non-EU countries. Cabotage will not be accepted,  and slots
will not be re-allocated. The ATC  system will also be a matter of concern. Maintenance of
present positions would perhaps be detrimental for most EU countries, so that the
probability of implementation of this option is rather  low.
Business as Usual (BAU)
This BAU scenario takes for granted that the current trends will gradually develop
so that more competition wil1 be introduced.  There is limited expansion of capacity both
in the air and on the ground, but here is not much  scope for newcomers. The system
serves mainly to protect the incumbent firms. There may  however, be some new alliances
and buy-outs in the European aviation sector. The congestion wil1 increase and hence the
efficiency will not rise drastically, so that European carriers will face great difficulties in
coping  with their American and Asian partners. This scenario is not entirely unlikely, but
winning countries would try to prevent it. In addition, the BAU scenario would stil1 impose
many  constraints on KLM’s  global carrier goal.
European Liberalisation (EUL)
This scenario takes for granted an entirely liberal  aviation system in Europe,
comparable to the American system. Slots will be open for re-allocation, while airports will
rapidly expand their capacity. Also grandfather rights will be abandoned. This means  that
the possibilities for a hierarchical hub-and-spokes system in Europe will be enhanced. State
owned carriers will vanish or be entirely re-organized. Intra-European competition may
however worsen the competitive position of the remaining European carriers with respect
to American or Asian carriers. There wil1 be significant mergers and take-overs in Europe.
This scenario is rather  far-reaching, but not entirely unrealistic. It  would imply that at the
end there will be a few winners, especially those which have the support of a global
network (such  as BA, Lufthansa or KLM).
Global  Liberalisation (GLL)
In the GLL scenario, the assumption is that the world aviation market will in some
20 years be entirely liberalised. At best there will be multi-lateral agreements between
continents or major regions. There will be fierce  price  competition, which will cause  the
emergence of global megacarriers which are operating in close cooperation with a wide
spectrum of national or regional carriers. After a shake-out  period the European airspace
will be dominated by a few (European and non-European)  airlines. This trend is of course
supported by new ATC  systems, airport expansions and slot re-allocation mechanisms.
This scenario may  in the long run become a feasible one.
If we position these 5 scenario’s in a SWOT (strength  (SI weakness (WI,
opportunities (0) threats (T)) diagram from the viewpoint of KLM’s  goal to become a global
carrier, we get the following picture (Figure 1).
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Figure 1. A SWOT picture for KLM
This picture maps out  the potential performance of KLM, if it manages to become
part of a Global  Airline System. It would have to strictly go for more tost  efficiency and
effectiveness, inter  alia by outsourcing, by building  up alliances with new feeder lines etc.
A sine qua non is clearly that its American partner, NWA, would also survive on the US
market and that KLM maintains good relationships with this partner. Despite these risks,
it seems plausible for KLM to support the GLL scenario. If however, this scenario would
become reality, the next question is which strategie  responses would be expected from
KLM.
The latter question can  be answered by using a qualitative pay  off matrix in a game-
theoretic sense, where the 5 scenario’s are put on the one axis and the KLM responses on
the other axis (sec  Figure 2). The following responses from the side of KLM can  be
envisaged:
A: remain an independent carrier
B: merge with a sufficiently large European carrier
C: become part of a strong European-wide alliance of carriers
D: form an alliance with one or more sufficiently large Asian carriers
E: reinforce the ties  with NWA (or any other US carrier)
F: a combination of B, D and E
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The entries of this matrix represent expected qualitative benefits for KLM.
scenario’s KLM responses
I II
BTP
STQ
BAU
EUL
GLL
A
+7---__ B C D E F__ -- ---+ 0 --+ + + 0+ + + + + + ++ + + + + + + + +
Figure 2. A pay-off matrix for KLM’s  strategies
It seems plausible that option F wil1 generate  the highest expected benefits for KLM.
It is certainly an option that is not without risk, but in light of global developments and
corporate objectives of KLM, it seems a realistic and promising choice. This strategy is
clearly based on the assumption that the deregulation and liberalisation movement will
continue in the next decades and that temporary problems of congestion and
environmental pollution will be effectively coped with.
Retrospect
The previous analysis lead to the following reflective remarks:
after liberalisation of the European airspace, new forms of networks are likely  to
emerge, with a tendency towards functional specialisation of airports organised in
a rather hierarchical form
the organisation of the aviation sector will not directly follow a clear hub-and-
s p o k e s  s y s t e m ,  b u t  rather  a  s y s t e m  o f  g l o b a l  h u b s  ( f o r  intercontinental
connections), Euro-hubs (for contra-European flights) and regional hubs (acting  as
a multi-layer feeder system)
the market share of European carriers is contingent upon  the degree of liberalisation
and non-protection; in case of a protected aviation sector, each European airline
may  be sure of a minimum market share (resulting from the protection of the
domestic market), but it would also face a maximum market size (imposed by
protecting strategies of other countries). This would stabilize the market, but the
lack  of competition would lead to an inefficiently operating airline industry
the role of railways as a feeder system ought to be recognized and this might lead
to a complete patchwork structure  of feeder situations
ongoing liberalisation will provoke more competition, which will lead to a situation
of tost  minimization, not only for intra-company operations, but also for the aircraft
industry. This may  cause  more strict  competition in this branch  of industry, where
there will be likely more new entrants from the Asian side.
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